Since Donald Trump’s ill-considered attack on Bashar Assad’s forces in Syria, many of those who hoped his presidency would be different from previous ones, ardent and luke-warm supporters alike, have come out in opposition to the sudden change of course in Trump’s foreign policy. They cite legitimate concerns over the seeming lack of U.S. national security interests in Syria, the possible assistance this military action has rendered to ISIS and other Islamist forces in Syria, and how this may very well have squandered whatever chance there might have been for rapprochement with Russia. All of these disadvantages and with very little if anything to show for it in return. These are all good points. Indeed, they are not wrong. However, it is unfortunately the case that those elements of the American leadership which have maneuvered Trump into this mess are looking at a very different set of considerations and performing their cost-benefit analyses of potential courses of action against an entirely different system of measurement.
We can look back to 2002, when George W. Bush made his “Axis of Evil” speech. I was eleven or twelve years old at the time, but I remember the speech. He named three countries: Iraq, Iran, & North Korea. Syria was later added to the list in the following months. Let’s just consider the logic of that for a moment. Why these particular countries? Why not, for example, Saudi Arabia – the country of origin for fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers?
Iraq, under Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist party, was a secular, Arab-nationalist state with socialism and ethno-nationalism coming together to provide the legitimizing ideology for the Iraqi state. If you look up Saddam’s speeches or read about the Ba’athist party, what you find is easily comparable to the socialist and national-socialist governments of Europe in the mid 20th century, right down to the romanticization of bygone ancestral kingdoms. This corresponds closely with the wider trend in Middle Eastern politics of the post-Ottoman period. Saddam’s regime was, therefore, opposed to political Islam in the strongest of terms. It was, after all, a competing and incompatible ideology as well as a potential instrument of Saudi influence.
Nassar’s Egypt, Ba’athist Iraq and Syria, Kamalist Turkey, Quddafi’s Libya, etc. These were all created from some combination of Arab (or Turkish) nationalism and secular leftist ideologies like fascism/communism. The more fascistic ones became allies, ostensibly, of the United States during the Cold War, while the more leftist ones tended to prefer cozying up to the Soviet Union. These latter states included Iraq (Saddam even modeled his own image on that of Josef Stalin), Syria, and Libya. Egypt moved back and forth, depending on who was in power. Turkey flirted with the Soviets from time to time, but they ended up solidly in the U.S. camp, joined NATO, and even hosted U.S. nuclear missiles.
Then, to skip ahead, came the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The Wahhabist sect of Islam, which was born out of the desserts of Arabia, was used as a political asset by the Gulf Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. This is no accident, of course, as Wahhabism is the official, state-sponsored religion of Saudi Arabia. The Saud dynasty rode into power on its back and invested heavily in its proliferation, thereafter.
In the 1970s, during the Soviet-Afghan War, the United States and NATO assisted in this proselytization effort. Tons of money poured into the construction of new religious schools to teach the tenants of this sect. Adherents of military age were encouraged to travel to Afghanistan to join the fight against the Soviets, while wealthy princes paid for their armaments, travel, and lodgings. These mujahidin brought their religion with them.
At the time, it probably seemed to have been to everyone’s benefit. The Saudis were exporting their state-ideology beyond their borders – an obvious benefit for them, as they were sewing seeds that they could later harvest in the form of political influence. The West was contributing to a network of foreign fighters, money, armaments, and equipment stretching from the Arabian peninsula, through Pakistan, and into the Soviet battlefield in Afghanistan – a Ho Chi Minh Trail of its own. Unfortunately, there were unforeseen consequences to all this.
The Wahhabi ideology was very effective in contributing to the fight against the Soviets. This was not so much owing to the effectiveness of Wahhabist foreign fighters from the Arabian peninsula (they were generally not considered very good soldiers by their Afghan comrades), but because the ideology itself provided the adhesive element which held together a loose network of people across a vast region. Their trust in one another and their common worldview facilitated a coordination of effort between these individuals, who contributed their time and personal resources to provide the native Afghan fighters with a constant chain of supply.
It was this key factor, especially with a bit of covert assistance from Washington, that allowed the Afghans to keep the fight going. The international network which was developing during this period was recognized to have a great deal of potential by people like Zbigniew Brzezinski in helping to break up the Soviet Union. How? The entire southern portion of the Soviet Union had been historically Islamic for hundreds of years. Spreading a militant form of Islam, diametrically opposed to atheistic socialism and unwilling to accept any form of rule but its own, into these regions could facilitate secessionist movements and fuel political instability. Money and armaments could be moved in through the same informal and semi-official networks that had done the job in Afghanistan, and little of this could be tied directly to Washington. Just how much potential did this strategy have?
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Azerbaijan, Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan are all majority-Muslim republics and districts, or have large Muslim minorities. Of these 13 regions, 7 are now independent states. There are to this day continual outbreaks of Islamist violence in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan, among other places.
Russia, however, was able to get back on its feet fairly quickly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and with the assistance of the secular governments of most of the above-named republics, including the independent ones, it worked to neutralize nascent militant networks, incarcerate or deport Islamist preachers and proselytizers, and cut off much of their funding from foreign sources as well as from the drug trade.
All the same, the process continues today. In one of these Russian republics, for example, where I was living and where about 50% of the population is Islamic, there had never been any problems with militant Islam either under the Tsars, the Soviets, or in the 1990s. This is largely true today, but some has managed to seep in through the cracks. While I was there, it was reported in the news that Russian security forces had raided a camp of militants a few hours outside the city, who somehow received advanced warning and managed to escape. This alone suggests that they were not a rabble of mere amateurs and wannabes.
Furthermore, new mosques are being built in the city in which I had then been living. Often, I am told, with the help of large contributions of Turkish or other foreign sources of money. These mosques have some rather shadowy elements attached to them, usually of foreign origin. This is true enough that some local residents shy away from these new constructions altogether and instead travel quite a distance out of their own way to attend more reputable, safer mosques.
Now another quick historical detour. Following the Second World War, the elites in the United States were determined not to make the same mistake they made after the end of the First World War in going back to what they have derogatorily termed “isolationism.” Many of them seem to have believed, in the beginning, that they could form a partnership with the Soviet Union where, after all, they had massive financial investments – factories, oil extraction facilities, petroleum refining and petrochemical processing plants, advanced technological production facilities, etc .
As it turned out, however, relations quickly soured after the end of WWII. The idiot, Roosevelt, with the full support of the equally mad Churchill had already handed over the proverbial keys to the castle by that time, and Truman failed to leverage America’s early possession of nuclear weapons to coerce Stalin into withdrawing from Eastern Europe. By the time Eisenhower took office, it was too late. The Soviets had their own bomb.
The military top brass and the intelligence communities devised, by 1960, a plan for a first strike once the technology allowed for it and U.S. intelligence showed that the Soviets’ missile housing facilities were vulnerable and could be largely (though not entirely) wiped out before they would have a chance to respond. Eisenhower and Kennedy, thankfully, both refused to do this. By 1962 Kruschev had remedied the situation and the era of Mutually Assured Destruction was ushered in, where neither side could come out intact from a nuclear confrontation, regardless of who struck first.
All through this period, US national security strategy was based on “containment.” Just about every government in the world was grouped into one bloc or the other and very little change was made. That is – until the war in Afghanistan. During the course of that conflict, it was quickly realized that the Soviet economy and political framework could not withstand long, drawn-out, expensive wars the way the mostly capitalistic United States was able to endure them in Korea and Vietnam.
So U.S. strategy, by the 1980s, seems to have shifted toward generating more Afghanistans and outspending the Soviets in defense. U.S. taxpayer dollars actually went into helping the Saudis and others finance and facilitate the creation and armament of networks of Islamists in Central Asia and Afghanistan. The trail of dirty money and maniacal madrassas followed the highway of NATO and West-aligned countries from Saudi Arabia through Turkey and on into the Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as through Pakistan and on into Afghanistan and upwards into the Soviet republics of Central Asia .
But the Soviet Union collapsed before another Afghanistan could be manufactured. US national security policy shifted again in the 1990s from generating Afghanistans to toppling the regimes of formerly Soviet-aligned states and replacing them with US-friendly regimes to prevent the potential emergence of another rival power to the United States – a resurgent Russia, Eurasian Union, or rising China, for example. (See “Rebuilding America’s Defenses” by the Project for A New American Century or “The Grand Chessboard,” by Zbegniew Brzezinski, etc.). To accomplish this, they have used those tools which were already at their disposal. Prominent among these and the one which is most relevant to the present discussion is, of course, the international, loosely-connected network of para-military Islamists, whose primary target no longer existed after 1991.
Predictably, this didn’t all turn out quite so smoothly. What government project ever does? The blowback began quite quickly, as these militarized networks surveyed the landscape and found, unsurprisingly, that it still had enemies in the form of the secular Arab regimes of the Middle East. Many of these were, conveniently for some, already in Washington’s crosshairs. On the other hand, quite a few others also happened to be aligned with and propped up by Washington. And so in some places (Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan, etc.) the Islamists were encouraged or facilitated, while in others (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman) they are targeted for destruction, as the Islamists in the latter countries had the audacity to bite the very hands that fed them, attacking the House of Saud and the United States.
I don’t think the targets of Washington’s adventures in nation-building and regime change in the Middle East and the primary targets of the Arab Spring are a coincidence. It seems to me that these events fit squarely within the context of similar regime-changes in Eurasia – (Georgia, Ukraine, Serbia, Kyrgyzstan) and of attempted ones in Russia or some of its peripheral territories.**
See “The Pentagon’s New Map” by one of the principal architects of this new National Security strategy, which advocates wars of police action, “regime change,” “nation building,” etc., against all those regions of the world that don’t like globalization. He labels such places, in true draconian fashion, “The Non-Integrating Gap.” His map looks remarkably similar to the 8-country list cited in the footnotes to this article with the addition of North Korea and most of Russia’s Eurasian allies, along with a big question-mark hanging over Russia, herself. This so-called “national security” strategy also advocates for mass immigration to the United States and Europe to replace our aging populations and keep America’s financial/military strength in its present superior position well into the foreseeable future. To hell, I suppose, with the societies and cultures one might have thought such financial and military might are there to preserve and protect.
So it seems to me that the recent attack on Syria is no mistake. It is not a mere gaffe, nor an intelligence failure, nor a knee-jerk, emotional response to an abhorrent crime. Nor was it aimed at enforcing a ban on the use of chemical weapons. This event is part of a much larger pattern of actions that suggests the globalists are busily and intentionally at work constructing their dystopian Tower of Babel. Unfortunately for all of us, they’re too damned blinded by their own hubris and pseudo-religious ideological zealotry to see the writing that has been slowly etching its way, deeper and deeper, into the walls of the White House, the United Nations, and EU Parliament over the last two decades as a direct consequence of their unnatural, tyrannically imposed order.
Just like his ancient predecessor, our modern-day Belshazzar is first consulting all the court sycophants, ambitious back-biters, and petty bureaucratic tyrants for the meaning of this scribble that defaces their monuments. And while Trump lends an ear to the devil upon his shoulder for a translation, others, more distant from the seat of power and thus less affected by the astigmatism which often affects its occupants, are reading this message with crystal clarity – “Mene mene tekel upharsin.”
. A list of formerly Soviet-aligned countries in the greater Middle East:
. Sutton, Antony C. “The Best Enemy Money Can Buy” – 1986
. See Sibel Edmonds’ & James Corbett’s YouTube series on Operation Gladio B
 Compare the following with the list from the first footnote:
The Russian Federation’s principal allies in the region in the Post-Soviet period:
List of US wars, interventions, and regime changes in the Middle East since the Soviet collapse in 1991:
- Iraq (1991/2003-present) – [Named Axis of Evil 2002] – Occupation + Regime Change
- Afghanistan (2002-present) – Occupation + Regime Change
- Somalia (1992-3, 1995) – Regime Change attempts, presently failed state with no de facto government.
- Syria (2011-present) – [Named Axis of Evil 2002] – Regime Change
- Libya (2011) – Regime Change
- Egypt (2011-12) – Regime Change
- Sudan(2011) – Partitioned into 2 Countries
. Barnett, Thomas P.M. “The Pentagon’s New Map” – 2004
** A similar policy is underway against China, also with Turkish and Saudi assistance, in Uyghuristan, for example. The president in exile, if I’m not mistaken, lives in Chicago.